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JAMES C. NICHOLAS' & JULIAN CONRAD
JUERGENSMEYER"

Market Based Approaches to
Environmental Preservation: To
Environmental Mitigation Fees and
Beyond
ABSTRACT

Impact fees are widely accepted and utilized across the United
States as a technique to generate revenue for capital
infrastructure improvements necessitated by new development.
This article looks at the origination of impact fees, their legal
framework, the extension of the concept towards environmental
protection, and an alternative economic approach in
environmental protection, "market based regulation." Based upon
techniques utilized primarily in the arenas of wetlands and air
quality regulation, a concept of utilizing economic incentives for
broader environmental protection is explored. Considerations of
the legal framework evolved through impacts fees are then applied
to possible implementation aspects of the concept.
I. INTRODUCTION
Present environmental problems facing the world today clearly
show that past techniques used for environmental protection have failed
to prevent environmental degradation. The decline of the environment,
signified by rising air pollution, water pollution, and deforestation
shows the inherent tension between economically profitable ventures
and environmental protection. This is the tragedy: environmental
preservation tends to not be "profitable" while environmental
degradation tends to be "cheaper." In essence, it is typically cheaper for a
private party to pollute than for that individual to protect environmental
resources. This construct, however, which arises as a result of concern
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with the "bottom line," exists separately from the social and natural
features that society might wish to have considered. But what if
environmental conservation were profitable? Can we move towards
regulatory paradigms where the profit motive works towards
preservation? Adam Smith told us that "it is not from the benevolence of
the butcher, the brewer or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from
their regard to their self-interest. We address ourselves not to their
humanity, but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our necessities,
but of their advantages." 1 There are-and could be many morescenarios in which private parties can find certain environmental
protection and preservation activities in their own economic selfinterest.2
When considering alternative methods from those presently
used, it is first necessary to realize that technology and progress are both
a cause and a potential solution to the decline of the environment.
Modem technology has produced many of the pollutants and wastes
that today cause much of the environmental degradation plaguing the
world's ecosystems. But technology, and the accumulated knowledge
that goes along with this technology, are helping to create alternative
production techniques and systems that can better protect, preserve, and
even enhance our environment. The implementation of alternative
techniques employed to preserve our natural systems are clearly not
costless, however. Additionally, protecting natural systems will have
further costs-typically as foregone development opportunities. The
enactment of regulations requiring environmental preservation has done
little to protect natural systems, especially after it was learned that the
penalties for violating such regulations were minimal.
Since new techniques used to protect the environment have
obvious costs, the key in establishing a program to better preserve our
environmental interests is to structure economic decision making so that
the "invisible hand" guides resources toward protection of the
environment through economic incentives to protect the environment.
The purpose of this article is to examine this incentive based approach to
environmental protection through the use of mitigation programs
funded by an environmental impact mitigation fee. Such a fee combines
some techniques being used in the United States and other countries to
compensate society for the impact of pollution and land development.
Part II of this article will explain and discuss one of these techniques, the
development impact fee, and will discuss how the impact fee has
evolved over the years to help mitigate the effects of new development.
1.
ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, quoted in R. HEILBRONER, THE WORLDLY
PHILOSOPHERS 530 (1970).
2. The most obvious is when it is a person's own environment that is being protected.
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Part III will then discuss other market-based regulatory schemes and
how they have been used to combat environmental degradation. This
section will focus attention on tradeable emissions programs and, more
importantly, wetland mitigation programs. Part IV will then discuss how
these different programs and techniques can be combined to create an
environmental impact mitigation fee that is grounded in a market-based
approach so as to make it a profitable venture to protect the
environment.
II. THE IMPACT FEE
A. Development of the Impact Fee
In one form or another, impact fees now exist in all 50 states and
are a common technique used to generate revenue for capital funding
necessitated by new development.3 Impact fees are charges imposed by
local governments that take the form of a predetermined monetary
payment-a fee-and are generally levied against developers to fund
capital expansion of large-scale public facilities and services.4 Such fees
play an integral part in giving local governments the ability to cope with
many burdens of rapid population growth such as the need for new
parks, roads, schools, jails, public buildings, sewer and water treatment
facilities, and public safety (fire, police, and EMS) facilities.'
Historically, it has been a primary function of state and local
governments to construct, operate, maintain, and improve the basic
physical infrastructure of American communities. However, as a result
of three significant events in American history, this traditional approach
began to break down. The first of these events was the sharp rise in
inflation in the 1970s 6 and the decimation of fixed based taxes such as the
motor fuels tax. The next was the federal government's fiscal retrenchment that began in 1982 and has continued since then, thus reducing the
funds made available to local jurisdictions. The third factor leading to the
3. See JULIAN C. JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING AND
DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW 421 (Practitioner Treatise 2003); JAMES C. NICHOLAS,
ARTHUR

C.

NELSON
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JULIAN

C.

JUERGENSMEYER,
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PRACTITIONER'S

GUIDE

TO

DEVELOPMENT IMPACT FEES 13 (1991).
4. See Susan M. Denbo, Development Exactions: A New Way to Fund State and Local
Government Infrastructure Improvements and Affordable Housing?, 23 REAL EST. L.J. 7, 11
(1994).
5. JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 3, at 421.
6. For most of the county's history inflation averaged two percent or less, with the
periods of war being significant exceptions. Beginning in the 1960s and continuing through
the 1980s, inflation existed at hitherto unprecedented rates, peaking at over 18 percent in
the late 1970s. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS website,
availableat www.bls.gov (last visited Oct. 2, 2003).
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breakdown of the traditional approach was the general hostility to the
taxation of real property, thus forcing local jurisdictions to look
elsewhere to fund the ever increasing demands of constituents.7 Because
these factors were occurring at a time when the pace of urban
development was increasing, both the demand for and the cost of
investment in public infrastructure began to climb at a time when the
available financial resources were falling. As a result, there arose an
increasing need for investment concurrent with declining means.
Due to the lessening of federal and state funding for such
infrastructure facilities as water pollution control and highway system
expansion and repairs, an increasing share of the responsibility to pay
for these and other public investments fell directly on local jurisdictions
by default. 8 In order to assume control of providing these infrastructure
needs, local governments were forced to pay the associated costs,
commonly by raising local property taxes. In turn, they were then hit by
the "taxpayer's revolt." Increasingly, local elected officials faced a public
demand to increase public services without increasing taxes. After failing
to remedy this dilemma through taxation, many jurisdictions looked to
their police power as a means of addressing the problem.
In terms of the police power, most local governments have great
discretion to regulate in order to protect the public's health, safety, and
welfare. In contrast, local governments have almost no discretion in the
exercise of their power to tax. It was natural, then, that local
governments would turn to the police power, where they had discretion,
in order to finance infrastructure needs. 9 Negative aspects of urban
growth, including congestion and loss of quality of life that further
growth and development would entail, provided the framework for
invoking the police power to protect the public. Thus, in order to make
up for public service funding lost as a result of the conditions mentioned
above, local governments began to impose conditions on development
that were consistent with the protection of the public's health, safety, and
welfare-this was accomplished through the implementation of the
impact fee.
In order to see how the impact fee originated, however, it is first
necessary to bring up the division of public services that had arisen in
7.

See

generally LAWRENCE

SUSSKIND,

PROPOSITION

2

1:

ITS

IMPACT

ON

MASSACHUSETTS (1983).

8. Both state governments and the federal government abandoned funding programs
for public investments because of a sharp rise in cost. Furthermore, there was a greater
burden on the local governments responsible for handling these matters because of
required improvements to many infrastructure facilities, such as water pollution control
facilities. See, e.g., The Water Pollution Control (Clean Water) Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq.
(1994).
9. See NICHOLAS, NELSON & JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 3, at 13.
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American public administration: governmental and proprietary services.
Governmental services were those needed in order to promote the
health, safety, and welfare of the public, but not provided for by private
entities. Examples of these types of services are police and fire
protection, as well as the maintenance of public roads and parks.
Proprietary services, on the other hand, are those services created for the
same purpose, but which can be and frequently are provided by the
private sector and for which service charges are imposed by the party
performing the service. Examples of this are trash collection and water
service.
Local governments had long charged for proprietary services,
and these charges-called user fees-were extremely common. These
user charges were possible because the benefit of providing a service
could be isolated to individual users, and if the individual user failed to
pay the charge, the user could be excluded from use or consumption.'0
Governmental services, on the other hand, are classified differently
because the cost of performing a service cannot be identified with a
single user nor can individuals be easily excluded from use or benefit.
Under this framework, initial proponents of the impact fee had the
objective of applying the principles of public finance, which had hitherto
been applied only to proprietary services, to governmental services. This
type of application, in the end, had the effect of reducing, if not totally
eliminating, the distinction between proprietary and governmental
services."
The legal implications of enacting a program such as this were
unknown at the time. Many, fearing that these fees would be seen as an
unconstitutional tax, initially set impact fees that were very low to pay
for governmental services. For example, the "land use fee" used in
Broward County, Florida,1 2 imposed for road improvement was $100 per
residence. Even so, this particular charge was struck down by a Florida
court as an unconstitutional tax.1 3 The court based its holding on the
theory that the fee exceeded the county's cost of regulation, which would
have justified its collection." This holding, like court holdings in many
other states, demanded that fees or charges assessed under the police
10. The water could be turned off or the trash left uncollected.
11. This distinction between types of services, while important in public
administration, received little if any judicial recognition. This may well be why the courts
had little problem with applying "proprietary" review criteria to "governmental"
functions.
12. The Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood metropolitan area.
13. See Broward County v. Janis Dev. Corp., 311 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1975).
14. Contractors & Builders Ass'n of Pinellas County v. City of Dunedin, 329 So. 2d 314
(Fla. 1976).
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power for the impact of new development be no greater than the costs
borne by the governmental entity in "regulating" new developmentotherwise, such a fee would be considered a tax. Ultimately, both the
definition of regulation and a detailed accounting of the "costs of
regulating" development allowed local governments to base the
imposition of impact fees on the police power and avoid the tax label. 5
Once at this stage, local governments were able to have their impact fee
programs classified as regulatory by demonstrating that new
development creates the need for new and expanded facilities, and then
collecting from new development its proportionate share of the cost of
expanding facility capacity. Even though local governments labeled
impact fees as regulatory, courts still required local governments to
produce 1calculations
and other data to support the reasonableness of
6
their fees.
The courts then devised several tests for reasonable "fees" as
distinct from unreasonable regulations or unconstitutional taxes. 7
California's "reasonable relationships 1 8 and Illinois' "specifically and
uniquely attributable" ' 9 tests have evolved over time to be closer to the
dual rational nexus test followed in many states and indirectly blessed
by Justice Scalia in Nollan.2° The objective of all of these tests was to
assure a rational relationship between the demands of new development
and assessments against it. Today the dual rational nexus test tends to be
followed in most states 2' because of its consistency with the "essential
15. The idea of regulation had to be expanded from the concept of simply imposing
rules and standards to actually imposing fees not classified as taxes, for health, safety, and
welfare purposes.
16. In Holmdel Builders Ass'n v. Township of Holmdel, 583 A.2d 277, 293 (N.J. 1990), the
court distinguished taxation from regulatory fees. The court stated that if the primary
purpose of the fee was to raise general revenue, it was a tax. However, if the primary
purpose was to "reimburse the municipality for services reasonably related to
development, it [was] a permissible regulatory exaction." Id.
17. See Julian C. Juergensmeyer & James C. Nicholas, Impact Fees Should Not Be
Subjected to Takings Analysis, in TAKING SIDES ON TAKINGS ISSUES: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
PERSPECTIVES 357-70 (Thomas E. Roberts ed., 2002).
18. First seen in Ayers v. City Council of City of Los Angeles, 207 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1949).
19. See, e.g., Pioneer Trust & Say. Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 176 N.E.2d 799
(111.
1961).
20. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
21. Many states have specifically enabled rational nexus type impact fees: Maine,
Vermont, New Hampshire, Georgia, Indiana, Wisconsin, Idaho, Washington, and Hawaii.
Many others have judicially established that test, including Florida. However, the modem
criteria in reasonable relationship states, such as California, look very much like rational
nexus. See Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 436-37 (Cal.1996). Also see the
reinterpretation of Illinois' specifically and uniquely attributable test to mean "rational
nexus" in Northern Illinois Home Builders Ass'n v. County of Du Page, 649 N.E.2d 384, 389-90
(Ill. 1995). In both instances, the current criteria for exactions are very similar to rational
nexus criteria. See generally JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 3, at 432-35.
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nexus" requirement of Nollan. The rational nexus test was designed to
ensure that impact fees imposed on a new development are
proportionate to the facilities and services needed as a result of the new
development and also with the benefits received by the new
development. Thus, two prongs must be met before an impact fee will
pass the rational nexus test: (1) impact fees may be no more than the
government's infrastructure costs that are reasonably attributable to the
new development and (2) the development required to pay the fee must
derive some benefit from the use of the fees collected.2' If the two prongs
of this test are not met, however, the impact fee in question has at times
been deemed an unconstitutional taking, entitling the property owner to
monetary damages.24 Whether the failure of an impact fee to meet
rational nexus criteria is unconstitutional taking of private property or
an illegal tax is a matter of current debate.'
B. Impact Fee Uses
Impact fees are currently being used for a wide variety of public
services and now represent a common fiscal tool used by local
governments in funding public service infrastructure needs.2 Impact fees
are assessed for the provision of water and sewer systems, roads, solidwaste facilities, libraries, parks, schools, police and fire facilities,
emergency medical facilities, environmental and habitat preservation,

22. The dual rational nexus test was originally used in Jordan v. Village of Menomonee
Falls, 137 N.W.2d 442 (Wis. 1965). See Julian C. Juergensmeyer & Robert M. Blake, Impact
Fees: An Answer to Local Governments' CapitalFunding Dilemma, 9 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 415, 430
(1981).
23. See Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 137 N.W.2d 442, 447 (Wis. 1965);
JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 3, at 434.
24. There are three general theories under which courts have held that a taking by
regulation has occurred: (1) a taking by invasion has occurred, (2) a regulation significantly
diminishes the value of the private property, and (3) the requirements placed upon a
landowner do not substantially advance the purpose of the regulation. In terms of impact
fees, developers most often advance the third theory listed. If, however, an impact fee has
fulfilled the nexus requirement of the dual rational nexus test, it will generally withstand
this type of challenge. See generally JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 3, ch. 10. See also
Home Builders Ass'n of Greater Des Moines v. City of W. Des Moines, 644 NW.2d 339,351
(Iowa 2002).
25. See generally Juergensmeyer & Nicholas, supranote 17, at 357-70.
26. In one form or another, impact fees exist in all states and have existed for a number
of years. See Gus Bauman & William H. Ether, Development Exactions and Impact Fees: A
Survey of American Practices, 50 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 51 (1987). The most recent trend
has been a shift toward more and higher impact fees, which grew from being minor
"economic nuisances" in the neighborhood of $1000 to $2000 per home to substantial
amounts commonly surpassing $10,000. JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 3 § 9.8B.
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public hospitals, and even public cemeteries.27 The most common use for
impact fees is in the funding of capital improvements for potable water
and sanitary sewer facilities. Transportation services such as highways
and bridges are the next most common type of impact fee.2 No matter
what the fee is used for, courts assess the validity of impact fees in large
part on how fairly and accurately it reflects a new development's
proportional share of the necessary infrastructure costs. 29 Because
accuracy is a major factor in determining the reasonableness of an impact
fee, impact fee programs require very careful economic analysis and
planning to determine what public facilities will be provided, the cost of
providing the infrastructure, and the proportion of that cost attributable
to the individual unit of development on the infrastructure facilities. 0
Therefore, the most widely upheld and implemented impact fees are
those based on data that indicate the desired level-of-service standards
for a particular facility and calculate the cost of maintaining those
standards in light of the increased demands created by new
development. 31 Today, impact fee formulae are the methods used to set
impact fees and are based on the fundamental theory of the police
power.12 Once the formulae are developed, the actual impact fee is then
derived by entering the data into the formulae. Impact fees can then be
offset with credits3 3 given by the local government to account for past
payment for existing capital facilities, future tax and other payments by
the development, and infrastructure and improvements to the land
provided directly by the developer.34
One of the more common uses for impact fees is to fund the need
for roads and highway systems brought on by new development. When
visualizing how the formula may be set for an impact fee assessment,
transportation network fees provide a useful example of how impact fees
are calculated and assessed. One of the first steps in calculating this type
27.

This list is merely illustrative, not exhaustive. See generally NICHOLAS, NELSON &
supra note 3, at 2.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 82.
30. The forgiving language in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 375 (1994), that
mathematical precision is not required, has not proven to be the case in impact fee
challenges.
31. See id.
32. If the developer were required to pay for more impact than they actually cause,
this would be a taking or a tax and, therefore, would be unconstitutional. Therefore, the
role of the formulae is to accurately determine the cost of the impact. See discussion supra
part B.A.
33. It is unfortunate that in impact fee methodology and literature "credit" has two
meanings. This first refers to a reduction in the amount of an impact fee to reflect other
funds devoted to that same facility or service. The second meaning refers to a donation or
dedication of land and/or facilities that allows an individual to pay impact fees "in kind."
34. See NICHOLAS, NELSON & JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 3, at 98-107.
JUERGENSMEYER,
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of impact fee is to determine the level and quality of service that the local
government wants to maintain or achieve-a desired level-of-service
standard. Once this is established, formulae are then developed to
determine the actual impact that a development will have on the
particular facility-in this case the highway system. For example, a
shopping center will have a very different impact on the highway system
than a single-family home. Differences such as this are then taken into
consideration in determining the amount of the fee.
For roads specifically, the impact fee formulae begin by
calculating the physical quantity of roads that must be built in order to
protect public health, safety, and welfare from deterioration in the
quality of service on public roads. This quantity of roads is physical and
is measured in lane miles or lane feet of roadways.n It is calculated by
multiplying the trip generation rate,- divided by two, times the average
trip length, times the percent of new trips, all divided by the capacity of
a lane mile (or foot) of roadway.37 The attributable travel is also reduced
to account for what are known as captured or diverted trips-that is,
trips that were already on the road and are not attributable to new
development. This results in a number of vehicular miles of travel, the
impact that may be attributed to new development. The next step is to
then calculate the cost of the road construction and to include credits. 8
The impact fee is then established based on the projected cost of new
construction less any "credits" for dedications the developer may be
entitled to.

35. A lane mile is a single lane of road, one mile long. A four-lane roadway one mile
long is, therefore, four lane miles.
36. Many jurisdictions use trip generation rates provided by the Institute for
Transportation Engineering (ITE), although jurisdictions may elect to conduct their own
trip generation studies.
37. The following is a general formula for roadway impact fee determination: (Trip
rate/2) x Trip length x % New trips = Attributable travel. (Attributable travel/Road lane
capacity) = New roads. (New roads (in lane miles)) x (Construction Cost (in lane miles)) =
Construction costs. (New roads (in lane miles)) x (Right of way cost (in lane miles)) = Right
of way costs. (Construction costs) + (Right of way costs) = Total cost. Following this
computation, any credits the developer may possess will be subtracted from the total cost
to obtain the impact fee.
38. Because roads are paid for in part by fuel taxes, new development should receive
"credit" because it will generate and attract new attributable travel, thereby consuming
fuel, the taxes on which will be used to pay for new roads. Because these taxes are paid
annually and in perpetuity, it is necessary to consider future payments as well. "Credit" for
the payment of past property taxes paid by the developer, which in part are used to fund
the building of roads, should also be applied.
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C. Impact Fee Evaluation and Future Uses for the Framework
Impact fees are now a commonplace means of infrastructure
finance. By requiring new land development to bear a proportionate cost
of providing the new or expanded infrastructure it will require, impact
fees provide, in part, an answer to the dilemma faced by local
governments when searching for sources of funding for capital
expenditures. Now that impact fees have been widely accepted by the
courts as regulatory measures, rather than unconstitutional taxes, they
are widely seen as funding programs that reasonably allow local
governments to maintain levels of capital facilities that can keep up with
growth.
There are limitations, however, to the traditional use of impact
fees. While they respond to the issues of location, availability, and
provision of capital infrastructure with regard to new development, they
are "largely unresponsive and even insensitive to the issue of the
quantity and type of growth that should be allowed to occur."-9
Furthermore, the traditional impact fee fails to respond to other growth
and development issues such as housing and employment needs.,°
Partly in response to these shortcomings associated with the
traditional impact fee and partly because of the success of impact fees in
raising funds for many infrastructure items, many local governments
have begun to explore the possibility of using the idea of the impact fee
to fund "soft" or "social" infrastructure needs such as "child care
facilities, low income or affordable housing, " 4' art in public places, and
environmental mitigation programs."4 2 These types of funding
requirements designed to raise funds for "soft," "social," and now
"green" infrastructure items are usually referred to as "linkage fees."43
When first implemented, "linkage" fees were thought to be something
distinct from "impact" fees.' Nollan v CaliforniaCoastal Commission45 dealt
the first blow to the perceived difference between linkage and impact
fees by holding that a nexus was essential to any condition of
39. NICHOLAS, NELSON & JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 3, at 48.
40. Christine Andrews & Dwight Merriam, Defensible Linkage, in DEVELOPMENT IMPACT
FEES (Arthur C. Nelson ed., 1988). See also Jerold S. Kayden & Robert Pollard, Linkage
Ordinances and Traditional Exactions Analysis: The Connection Between Office Development and
Housing, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 127, 128-29 (1987).
41. The most recent contribution to affordable housing as "social" infrastructure is
Marc T. Smith & Ruth L. Steiner, Affordable Housing as an Adequate Public Facility,36 VAL. U.
L. REV. 443 (2002).
42. JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 3, at 442.
43. See generally Andrews & Merriam, supra note 40.
44. See Donald L. Connors & Michael E. High, The Expanding Circle of Exactions: From
Dedications to Linkage, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 69 (1987).
45. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
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development approval requiring a dedication. The Ninth Circuit further
diminished any distinction in Commercial Builders of Northern California v.
Sacramento46 by applying what were essentially impact fee criteria to
what was characterized as an affordable housing "linkage" requirement.
Today the weight of opinion is that there are no fundamental differences
between "linkage" and "impact" fees, but the convention of naming soft,
social, or green impact payments linkage and applying impact to hard
infrastructure remains.
To the extent that any differences can be identified between
linkage and impact, most linkage programs have a primary goal of
problem mitigation or abatement rather than payment. Impact fees are
almost the reverse, in that the expectation is that payment of the fee will
be the primary means of compliance. A linkage program would identify
a concern and require that the concern be abated or mitigated, and, if not
abated or mitigated, a payment would be made and the proceeds
derived would be used to abate or mitigate the problem. An impact
program would require the payment of a specified amount, the proceeds
of which would be used to construct specified public facilities, unless the
individual elects to sufficiently mitigate or abate the problem by
construction/dedication of those facilities.
III. A MARKET BASED APPROACH TO ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION
Many local governments are now exploring the possibility of
requiring developers to account for soft infrastructure needs through
linkage programs.47 The use of such protocols to protect the environment
would signify a shift from command and control regulations that have
been employed to control environmental degradation in the past.4'
Command and control regulation, or traditional regulation of the
environment, has long been criticized as being too rigid, inefficient, and
ineffective.49 And, while this traditional regulatory method may have
valid and useful applications, the drawbacks of the scheme have led

46.

941 F.2d 872 (1991).

47. ROBERT MELTz, DWIGHT H. MERRIAM & RICHARD M. FRANK, THE TAKINGS ISSUE:
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON LAND USE CONTROL AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 517

(1999).
48. The "command and control" form of environmental protection refers to mandated
environmental controls instituted after the enactment of the National Environmental Policy
Act (1969) and subsequent acts such as the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act in the
1970s. See Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental Regulation: A
New Era Froni an Old Idea?, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 5-6 (1991).
49. See BERNARD FRIEDEN, THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION HUSTLE (1979); RALPH A.
LUKEN, EFFICIENCY IN ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION (1990).
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many to believe that a market-based regulatory framework is needed in
order to better protect environmental resources.50 For the purposes of this
article, the term "market based regulation" refers to the more recent
environmental reforms that attempt to use market forces-Smith's
"invisible hand"-more extensively than in traditional regulations. This
is done by making the desired end, in this case environmental protection,
in somebody's economic interest, meaning that someone must profit
from environmental protection. One of the main goals of market-based
pollution control programs is to reduce the cost of complying with
environmental regulations. One way that a market-based regulatory
framework allows for this is to allow the polluter,'1 not regulators, to
determine the most efficient means of reducing pollution.52 The polluter
is not given a choice with respect to the end, pollution abatement or
environmental protection, but the polluter is given a choice on how best
to achieve that end. One of the choices is to hire another, a "mitigator,"
to achieve the desired end on behalf of the polluter.
A. Tradeable Emission Programs
One of the more prominent types of market-based
environmental regulation is the tradeable emission. The goal of most
tradeable emission programs, unlike impact fees, is to reduce the total
amount of existing pollution rather than justly compensating society for
the costs associated with new pollution. Another goal of this type of
program is to improve the efficiency of meeting environmental
regulations, thus making stringent pollution or environmental standards
more economically feasible than with a traditional regulatory format."
The typical tradeable emissions program begins with regulations
setting a cap-an upper limit-on the total amount of emissions for a
particular region and for a specific type of air pollution. The regulator
then allocates a number of tradeable emission credits to polluters, not to
exceed the cap for that region. Polluters are then allowed to continue to
pollute up to the level authorized by their credits or sell the credits they

50. See Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37
STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1335-38 (1985).
51. The term polluter is used here simply to identify the producer of the item that
would represent environmental or social harm.
52. See Matthew Polesetsky, Will a Market in Air Pollution Clean the Nation's Dirty Air?:
A Study of the South Coast Air Quality Management District's Regional Clean Air Incentives
Market, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 359, 369 (1995).
53. In theory, the cost savings produced through more efficient measures of meeting
environmental regulatory standards would allow for more stringent standards to be set, an
important aspect of the program for those interested in reducing pollution, not reducing
costs for industry. See Hahn & Stavins, supranote 48, at 33.
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possess to other polluters in the same program. The flexibility of the
program is seen in the fact that the regulator does not specify the means
by which the polluter attains the level of pollution set by the number of
credits held. Instead, the polluter can reach this level by whatever means
they think are most efficient and effective." Thus, tradeable emission
credits can increase efficiency by encouraging entrepreneurs to develop
better pollution control devices and substitute pollution abatement for
pollution by credit, while selling pollution credits, potentially for a
profit.5 - In this manner someone profits from pollution abatement.
Contrast this situation with the typical command and control situation.
As long as the polluter stays under the preset limit, there is no profit in
pollution reductions.
1. Tradeable Emissions in Action: California'sRECLAIM
California's Regional Clean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM) is
currently one of the largest trading programs operating in the world.s
This program was first adopted in 1994 to reduce air pollution in the Los
Angeles area-the region with the most air pollution in the United
States.57 In order to combat this problem, RECLAIM was implemented in
1993 in order to reduce existing pollution by targeting reductions in
stationary sources of nitrogen oxide and sulfur dioxide. This was to be
accomplished by creating a market in tradeable emission credits that
would achieve the same level of pollution reduction as targeted by
traditional regulations already in place.!8 Because of political pressures
and economic forces at work in the area at the time, the goals of
RECLAIM were twofold: to attain high air quality goals while reducing
the costs of pollution control.59 The basis of the tradeable emission
54. See Robert W. McGee & Walter E. Block, Pollution Trading Permits as a Form of
Market Socialism and the Search for a Real Market Solution to Environmental Pollution, 6
FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 51,53 (1994).
55. See Polesetsky, supra note 52, at 369.
56. See Pat Leyden, The Price of Change: The Market Incentive Revolution, 12 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV'T 160, 161 (1998).
57. Alliance of Small Emitters/Metals Indus. et al. v. So. Coast Air Quality Mgmt.
Dist., 60 Cal. App. 4th 55, 57 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
58. See Leyden, supra note 56, at 160.
59. Leading up to the implementation of RECLAIM, the agency in charge of air quality
management in the area-the South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD)was under pressure to find alternatives to reduce air pollution. At the same time, the Los
Angeles area was experiencing a severe economic recession. See Scott Lee Johnson & David
M. Pekelney, Economic Assessment of the Regional Clean Air Incentives Market: A New Emission
Trading Programfor Los Angeles, 72 LAND ECON. 277, 279 (1996). Thus, businesses were
seeking more cost effective means of meeting environmental regulations because of the
high costs of meeting the requirements of traditional regulations. See Leyden, supra note 56,
at 160.
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program for RECLAIM was to give each existing polluting facility a
mass allocation of pollution credits, in effect a right to pollute, based on
emissions during prior years. 6' Each of the credits allocated represents
one pound of emissions of one particular pollutant and has a term of one
year.6 ' New facilities, however, do not receive any emission credits and
must purchase the credits from other facilities.62 Pursuant to the number
of emission credits given to a facility, the polluter's yearly pollution may
not exceed the amount of tradeable emission credits that it holds. 63 The
program's flexibility can be seen in the fact that the polluter is then given
the choice of how that emissions cap would be most efficiently met. If the
polluter is then able to reduce air pollution to levels below the individual
cap set for it, it may then sell any excess credits it owns to another facility
that has insufficient credits to meet its emission rate limits.64 This option
allows some facilities to maintain pollution levels at their current rate
despite reductions in the overall emissions cap for that facility by buying
excess credits from another facility.
While it is apparent how this method potentially saves the
polluter in cost, the South Coast Air Quality Management District
(SCAQMD) must also reduce the emission cap on each facility every year
in order to fulfill the second goal of the tradeable emission programattaining high air quality goals.65 Reports show that RECLAIM was
initially successful in achieving many of its goals. By 1999, six years after
the implementation of RECLAIM, results looked promising. RECLAIM
had high compliance rates of over 90 percent and over $35 million in
credits had been traded. 66 By 2003, emissions of nitrogen oxide were
expected to be reduced by 17 tons per day, and the projected costs of
meeting these reductions were reduced by almost half in comparison to
projected costs of meeting the same reduction under the traditional
regulatory framework-from $139 million to $80 million annually.6 7
Recently, however, the effectiveness of the program has been called into
question.
In November 2002, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
for District Nine (including Southern California) issued a report
60.

See Daniel P. Selmi, Impacts of Air Quality Regulation on Economic Development, 13

NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 382, 386-87 (1998).

61. South Coast Air Quality Management District, 20 Regional Clean Air Incentives
Market § 2007(c)(1).
62. Polesetsky, supra note 52, at 386.
63. Johnson & Pekelney, supra note 59, at 281.
64. Alliance of Small Emitters/Metals Indus. et al. v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist.,
60 Cal. App. 4th 55,57-8 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
65. Leyden, supra note 56, at 160.
66. See id. at 163.
67. Id. at 164.

Summer 2003]

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

evaluating the effectiveness of RECLAIM. The evaluation of the program
was conducted after the EPA discovered that the price of tradeable
emission credits had risen drastically during 2000 and 2001, while at the
same time some facilities under RECLAIM had a very difficult time
meeting emission standards. In the EPA's final report, it found different
factors that may have led to a decrease in the efficiency of the RECLAIM
program. One of the largest problems found with the program is that it
was unable to react to certain political and economic externalities that
may have driven the price of credits to a point where it became difficult
for polluters to afford to trade credits. 69 Even so, the EPA did find that
RECLAIM as a whole had been effective in reducing costs for polluters
to comply with regulations, in large part because "facilities were able to
minimize costs by controlling emissions using the least costly
methods."7'
2. Evaluation of Tradeable Emission Programs
Despite the advantages of tradeable emissions programs, it is
clear that they are not a perfect solution to air pollution. Externalities,
such as the political and economic climate on the local, state, and
national level, can have unforeseen impacts on the effectiveness of such a
program. These climates must support pollution reduction requirements
and require stringent reductions in overall pollution for such a plan to
work effectively. 7' A clear baseline of allowable pollution that protects
traded.7
the environment must be set, from which credits can then be
Some commentators consider this type of program to be a quick fix
rather than a long-term solution to environmental regulation, because
many tradeable emissions programs fail to provide an incentive for
continuous pollution reduction.? In essence, once a polluter has met
pollution requirements set by the regulating body, no incentive remains
to further reduce pollution-as one commentator states, the "equilibrium
68. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA's Evaluation of the RECLAIM Program in the South
Coast Air Quality Management District (2002), availableat http://www.epa.gov/Region9/
air/reclaim/index.html (last updated Oct. 2, 2003).
69. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, An Evaluation of the South Coast Air Quality
Management District's Regional Clean Air Incentives Market-Lessons in Environmental
Markets and Innovation 44-45 (2002), available at http://www.epa.gov/Region9/air/
reclaim/report.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2003). The EPA's report found the energy demand in
Southern California during 2000 had the unforeseen effect of causing a spike in the price of
tradeable credits, which in turn put a strain on the market. See id.
70. Id.
71. See Leyden, supra note 56, at 161.
72. Ann Powers, Reducing Nitrogen Pollution on Long Island Sound: Is There a Place for
PollutantTrading?, 23 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 137, 161 (1998).
73. David M. Dreisen, Is Emissions Trading an Economic Incentive Program?:Replacing the
Command and Control Economic Incentive Dichotomy, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 289, 323 (1998).
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point." 7 Even when trading programs have succeeded in reducing air
pollution by setting pollution caps at levels substantially lower than
existing pollution levels, these programs will not encourage further
reduction once the equilibrium point has been met.7h There is no longer a
profit in pollution reduction. Putting a profit in further pollution
reduction would address this shortcoming.
Another criticism of the program is that it focuses more on the
concerns of reducing costs for industry while ignoring the health of
people who live near polluting facilities. There is a concern that many
pollution credits will be traded into poorer neighborhoods resulting in
higher emissions in areas with less political power. 76
B. Mitigation: Programs for Prevention of Loss of Wetlands
While the issue of air quality remains a hot topic, rising to the
forefront in the environmental community of late is the issue of
preventing the loss of wetlands as a result of development. This issue
came to the forefront in 1989 when President George H.W. Bush declared
a "no net loss" of wetlands goal.' This goal was again reaffirmed in 1993
when the Clinton Administration expressed support for an "interim goal
of no overall net loss of the Nation's remaining wetlands, and the longterm goal of increasing the quality and quantity of the Nation's wetlands
resource base. " 78 "A variety of federal, state, and local laws and
regulations affect development in wetland areas."7 The goal of these
laws and regulations is similar to the goal of impact fees-the developer
should compensate for the development's burden on the environment.
Unlike emission trading, however, wetland mitigation regulations apply
principally to new developers as opposed to existing industrial polluters.

74.

Id. at 324.

75. Id. at 317.
76. See Nina Schuyler, Clean Air Inc.: Do Market-Based Emissions Controls Mean the Poor
Breathe the Dirtiest Air?, 15 CAL. LAW. 39 (1995). But see Leyden, supra note 56, at 163
(arguing that RECLAIM has not resulted in increased pollution to any particular geographic area).
77. President's message to the Congress Transmitting the Fiscal Year 1990 Budget,
Building a Better America, 25 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 184, at 91 (Feb. 9, 1989).
78. White House Office on Environmental Policy, Protecting America's Wetlands: A
Fair, Flexible, and Effective Approach (Aug. 24, 1993), availableat http://www.wetlands.
com/ fed/aug93wet.htm.
79. MARK S. DENNISON, WETLAND MITIGATION: MITIGATION BANKING AND OTHER
STRATEGIES FOR DEVELOPMENT AND COMPLIANCE 33 (1997).
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1. Federal Wetland Regulation
The main federal laws that regulate wetland development
(NEPA) and
activities are the National Environmental Policy Act
8
the
Following
0
(CWA).
Act
Water
Clean
the
of
sections 401 and 404
the
consider
to
agencies
federal
required
which
passage of NEPA,
the
amended
Congress
development,
proposed
environmental impact of
8'
primary
the
provides
now
program
404
CWA. The CWA Section
82
federal authority for protecting the nation's wetlands. Section 404 is
jointly implemented and enforced by the U.S. EPA and the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers (Corps) and requires that "wetland damage due to
development should be avoided, lessened, or compensated in
' 83
descending order of preference." Through Section 404, the Corps
regulates the discharge of dredged or fill materials through a permitting
process. Even if the dredge and fill permit is granted, however, the
Corps' role in the development process is not over. As mentioned earlier,
it is a national goal-a goal adopted by the Corps-for a "no net loss to
wetlands (of values and functions)."' Therefore, the Corps may require
changes to the plans of a project and will usually require some wetlands
mitigation measure to offset the negative impact of development on
wetlands habitats.5 Even with the restrictive nature of the regulations,
federal agencies and private property owners have traded millions of
acres worth millions of dollars, with the result being preservation of
substantial environmentally sensitive areas.' Often times, the Corps'
requirements of mitigation are a result of state wetlands mitigation.
2. State Wetlands Regulation
Before Section 404 dredge and fill permits are even considered
87
by the Corps, all necessary state wetland approvals must be secured.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 34.
H.
82. For a discussion of the various federal regulatory programs, see Dwight
(1991).
133-41
119,
PLI/REAL
367
Regulation,
Wetland
Lin,
Merriam & Catherine
83. See Joy Roth, Mitigation Banking and the Clean Water Act, PROF. GEOLOGIST (Oct.

1998).

84. Memorandum of Agreement Between EPA and Dept. of the Army Concerning the
55
Determination of Mitigation Under the Clean Water Action Section 404(b)(1) Guidelines,
1990).
12,
(Mar.
Fed. Reg. 9210,9211
85. See JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 3, at 626.
86. Dwight H. Merriam, Reengineering Regulation to Avoid Takings, 33 URB. LAW. 1, 35

(2001).

87. See 33 C.F.R 320.4(j). Under the Clean Water Act section 404 program, individual
states may adopt and administer their own wetland protection programs, which must be
approved by the Corps. Once the program has been approved, the state, rather than the
to
Corps, may issue section 404 permits directly. The EPA, however, retains veto power
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The degree of state wetlands regulation by law ranges from minimal to
stringent. A number of states have enacted enabling laws that grant the
authority to enact wetlands protection ordinances to local governments.
"Thus, a landowner or developer may need to comply with three layers
of regulation from federal, state, and local authorities. "" Even so,
participation in state and local wetland mitigation programs will often
satisfy the mitigation requirements on which a section 404 permit
approval is conditioned.
3. Forms of Mitigation: Wetland Mitigation Banking
The Corps and many states have allowed a wide range of
mitigation measures, including (1) increased public access to the area; (2)
acquisition of other wetlands to provide enhanced protection or
acquisition with a management commitment; (3) restoration or creation
of wetlands, either as general compensation or as replacement for a
specific habitat type; (4) indemnification or direct monetary payment for
lost wetland values; and (5) mitigation banking (compensatory offsite89
wetlands restoration or creation).'
Approaches (1) and (2) are no longer permitted by states or the
Corps "unless the goal of increased public access is compensation for lost
public recreational opportunities, or the acquisition includes enhancement or assurance of proper management to compensate for lost wetland
values."" In contrast, the mitigation banking option, option (5), is being
implemented increasingly as the mitigation method of choice. Like air
emissions trading, mitigation banking is a market-based regulation
program designed to create an alternative means of environmental
preservation by combining investment opportunities with environmental concerns. 9' In the United States today, there are over 100
mitigation banks either operating or proposed.

withdraw the state's section 404 permitting authority if regulatory and statutory
requirements are not followed. DENNISON, supra note 79, at 62.
88. MARK S. DENNISON & JAMES F. BERRY, WETLANDS: GUIDE TO SCIENCE, LAW,
AND
TECHNOLOGY 268 (1993).
89. Offsite mitigation is mitigation that is outside the area in which the development is
planned. See Merriam & Lin, supra note 82, at 137.
90. See DENNISON, supra note 79, at 291. Restoration and creation of wetlands are
components of mitigation banking programs, with restoration of existing wetlands being
the method preferred by most environmentalists rather than the creation of new wetlands.
Royal C. Gardner, Banking on Entrepreneurs: Wetlands, Mitigation Banking, and Takings, 81
IOWA L. REV. 527, 552 (1996).
91. See DENNISON, supra note 79, at 291.
92. See JoAnne L. Dunec, Economic Incentives: Alternatives for the Next Millennium, 12
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 292, 292 (1998).
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The basic premise is that mitigation banking is mitigation done
outside the area in which the development is planned (offsite
mitigation). This type of mitigation allows the developer or polluter to
pay another firm to take over the responsibility for mitigation. This
allows a developer whose project is assessed as having a certain number
of units of environmental impact to pay a private company, which has
already purchased land identified for conservation in the comprehensive
plan, an amount equal to the units of environmental impact assessed on
the project. The incentive for such a program to the developer is that the
private mitigation company may be able to offer this service at a price
that is less than what it would cost the developer to pursue other means
of mitigation.
The typical mitigation bank involves the creation of wetlands
from upland areas, but banking has been expanded to include other
compensatory activities such as restoration or enhancement of degraded
wetlands or the provision of more stringent protection for wetlands
threatened by human activities not subject to regulatory control. There
are two key aspects that distinguish mitigation banking from other forms
of mitigation programs. First, banking attempts to construct mitigation
areas, or banked wetlands, far in advance of anticipated development
impacts in an area. This is one of the key attractions to mitigation
banking-fully functional bank wetlands will be attained by the time
impacts are contemplated. Second, banks are generally large in area to
provide this trading service for a number of different contemplated
impacts, "as opposed to the typical impact-by-impact process"
associated with traditional mitigation programs. Thus, banking
consolidates many small, fragmented mitigation projects into fewer,
much larger contiguous sites.
The general process of mitigation banking is usually initiated
when the need for a bank is identified by a governmental planning
agency, developer, or other party anticipating future mitigation needs in
a given area. A requirement for all banks is that a corporate, non-profit,
or governmental "sponsor" acquires or possesses a long-term interest in
a large piece of land. The land must then be suitable to support the
anticipated functional needs of a wetland habitat.
There are typically four types of wetlands mitigation banks,
which are classified on the basis of the nature of the sponsors and credit
users or purchasers. The first type is typically known as a single user
wetland mitigation bank, where the bank is developed and exclusively
used by "a single public or private entity to provide for its own
mitigation needs." 9 The next type of bank is known as a

93.

See Shirley Jeanne Whitsitt, Wetlands Mitigation Banking, 3 ENVTL. L. 441, 454 (1997).
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public/commercial or public/private bank. These are owned by the
government, which sells mitigation credits to the general public.4
Another type of mitigation bank is known as a private/private or
private/commercial (entrepreneurial) bank. These banks sell mitigation
credits to the general public but are privately owned and operated. 9
The ownership and management of mitigation banks is open to
innovative arrangements. Perhaps the most interesting partnership in the
country is that found at the Monastery of the Holy Spirit in Conyers,
Georgia. The Trappist monks there joined with a Savannah based
company, Wetlands Environmental Technologies, to form a mitigation
bank. The company spent $2 million restoring 500 acres of destroyed
wetlands on the monastery's property and is now recouping its
investment through the sale of wetlands credits.9 The monastery
considers itself to have profited financially and spiritually from the
arrangement.97
Mitigation Banks are designed to either replace anticipated
functional losses within a specified trading area or replace identified
historical functional losses with an area. The regulating agency then
values the bank by quantifying the created or restored wetland functions
in terms of "credits." The calculation of these credits may be done simply
by the amount of acreage and the wetland type, or by quantifying
habitat, physical and biological functions, and social values.9" The total
credits allocated to a bank are based on the difference in the quality of
the ecosystem before and after the bank is established. The regulating
agency then undertakes a substantial permitting process, establishing the
bank's goals, ownership, location, size, wetland and/or other resource
types, trading area, crediting methods and accounting procedures,
performance and success criteria, monitoring and reporting protocol,
contingency plans, financial assurances, long-term responsibility, and
detailed construction plans.
94. Id. at 455. An offshoot of the public/private type bank can be seen in the state of
Florida. It is possible for the state to own the land that the bank is to be created on, but a
problem arises when the state lacks the funding or the impetus to administer the bank. In
this situation, even though the state owns the land, a private company can put up bids for
the credits, and then the state and the private administering company split the mitigation
proceeds resulting from the sale of credits. Telephone Interview with Sheri Lewin, Director,
Mitigation Marketing (Mar. 25, 2003).
95. Whitsitt, supra note 93, at 457.
96. Id.
97. Kevin Duffy, Restoring Nature: Refurbished Wetlands Profitable for Humans,
Environment, ATLANTA J. CONST., Mar. 31, 2003, at C1.
98. See Marjut H. Turner & Richard Gannon, Mitigation Banking, in WATERSHEDS:
WATER, SOIL, AND HYDRO-ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEM 1 (1999). See also Joy
Roth, Mitigation Banking and the Clean Water Act, available at http://www.agiweb.
org/legislO5/tpgjoy.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2003).
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The next step involves the projection of anticipated, unavoidable
impacts of development, through which applicants can purchase credits
from the mitigation bank to make up for the projected wetlands losses
(or debits) that the development will create.9
4. Evaluation of Existing Wetlands Mitigation Banking Programs
Many believe that wetlands mitigation programs are helping to
lay the framework for future market-based regulations and have
innumerable positive aspects. On the other hand, some believe that this
type of mitigation bank is unsuccessful in mitigating the harms created
by new development. 100However, it is clear that successful mitigation
banks offer larger, ecologically superior wetland areas, an attractive
alternative to "postage-sized" on-site mitigation projects, which often
fail.'0 ' Other advantages to mitigation banking can be seen from the
perspective of the developer. By purchasing or using existing mitigation
credits, they are able to save the time and expense involved in designing,
implementing, and maintaining specific mitigation plans for each
project." 2 On the regulatory side, mitigation banks are advantageous to
state and local authorities because they allow for increased "efficiency of
3
review and compliance monitoring." Others see mitigation banks as
superior to other types of mitigation because they generally include
greater portions of viable ecosystems for fish and wildlife, they remove
from the reach of developers the aquatic resources provided by
wetlands, and, perhaps most importantly, they "result[] in mitigation

99. See Turner & Gannon, supra note 98.
100. See Merriam & Lin, supra note 82, at 135.
101. Whitsitt, supra note 93, at 459-60. Whitsitt describes four reasons for on-site
mitigation failure:
(1) the isolated and fragmented nature of replacement wetlands which
makes them vulnerable to functional degradation; (2) the lack of a federal
regulatory requirement that permittees must maintain successful
mitigation sites; (3) the lack of sufficient technical expertise by regulatory
agencies to evaluate a large number of diverse mitigation plans
adequately; and (4) the lack of regulatory agencies to oversee and enforce
mitigation construction and to conduct site monitoring.
Id. Even so, many environmentalists continue to argue that offsite mitigation does not
confront the importance of wetland functions to the particular site. To develop that site,
they might argue, is to destroy the wetland's relationship to other wetlands, sources of
ground water and surface water, and adjacent uplands. See DENNISON & BERRY, supra note
88, at 301.
102. Id.
103. See Robert W. Brumbaugh, Wetland Mitigation Banking: Entering a New Era?, at 4,
(last
available at http://www.wes.army.mil/el/wrtc/wrp/bulletins/v5n3/brum.html
visited Oct. 2, 2003).
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being performed in advance of, rather than subsequent to, wetland
conversion projects. " '°4
Advance mitigation has two principal benefits. First, advance
mitigation eliminates concerns that, once a permit is granted, mitigation
may never take place. Perhaps more importantly, however, mitigation
banking shows promise as a step toward moving past a "no net loss"
attitude and actually realizing a gain in wetlands' °
IV. JOINING FORCES: IMPACT FEES, LINKAGE, AND
ENVIRONMENTAL MITIGATION FEES'0
Environmental linkage programs, which combine the principles
of market-based regulation, such as those underlying tradeable
emissions and wetlands mitigation banking, with the principles of
impact fees, may provide economic incentives for developers to actually
increase conservation, as opposed to merely maintaining the
environmental status quo. Such a program could be packaged in an
environmental mitigation fee. Although some local governments have
attempted to establish similar "linkage fees" in order to finance "social"
or "soft" infrastructure needs, a more overarching plan is needed in
order to establish a program that is likely to harness market forces to
make environmental protection possible while at the same time limiting
available attacks on such a program. The purpose of this section of the
article is to examine the use of an environmental mitigation fee using the
implementation standards that have guided the use of impact fees while
at the same time attempting to guide environmental regulation to a more
market-based approach.
The goal of an environmental mitigation fee should be to move
away from the on-site regulatory framework and toward a more broadbased and long-range approach to environmental protection.
Historically, mitigation of the ecological impact of development and
pollution has been addressed on a case-by-case basis. ' 07 Each individual
development or polluting facility has been required to minimize its own

104. Id.
105. Whitsitt, supra note 93, at 477.
106. The authors have previously expressed their concept of environmental mitigation
fees, especially in the European context. See James C. Nicholas, Julian C. Juergensmeyer &
Ellen Margrethe Basse, Perspectives Concerning the Use of Environmental Mitigation Fees as
Incentives in Environmental Protection (Part 1), 2 ENV. LIAB. 27 (1999); James C. Nicholas,
Julian C. Juergensmeyer & Ellen Margrethe Basse, Perspectives Concerning the Use of
Environmental Mitigation Fees as Incentives in Environmental Protection (Part I), 3 ENV. LIAB.
71 (1999).
107. See Arthur C. Nelson, James C. Nicholas & Lindell L. Marsh, Environmental Linkage
Fees are Coming, 58 PLANNING 1, 2 (1992).
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impact on site, or mitigate its impact through some regulatorily
approved means. As we have discussed earlier, this can result in
fragmented scraps of habitat that may not assure an adequate critical
'
mass, and it may not be the best place for the habitat in the long term. 08
Through the use of an environmental mitigation fee, solutions to many
of these problems could be more readily available. To do this, however,
requires long range planning of environmental goals.
A first step is to expand the context of "environment." The
concept of the environment in mitigation and tradeable emissions is
wetland destruction or air pollution. While these are certainly
components of "the environment" and its protection, the environment of
concern is much greater. It includes wetlands, habitat, clean air, and
water, but it also includes trees and open spaces, as well as sites with
cultural and historical importance. It would include places to walk or
just sit by a stream. In sum, the environment includes those places that
should be left as they are or restored to what they were, if degraded.
Any effective regulatory program will require three things:
" First, the specification of a level of service;
* Second, incorporation into a comprehensive plan; and,
" Third, the adoption of regulations that maintain the
level of service in accordance with that comprehensive
plan.
The authority of local governments to protect public health, safety, and
welfare has long been recognized. 1" The goal of such efforts extends
beyond clear issues of public safety to matters of aesthetics, what we
today call quality of life."0 However, development regulations designed
to protect the public should be in accordance with a comprehensive
plan."' Thus, the community goals with respect to the environment
should be contained within a comprehensive plan and that plan would
become the basis for protective regulations.
Planning, both comprehensive and long-range, is most needed
for habitat preservation. Critical and intact habitat must be identified
early on. Identified land, perhaps furthest away from being developed,
can be purchased, thus preventing fragmentation of habitats. We have
108. Id. See also supra note 100 and accompanying text.
109. See, Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 47S. Ct 114, (1926).
110. Id. See also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 98 S. Ct 2646, 438 U.S. 104
(1978).
111. See Article 3 of the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act, US Dep't of Commerce,
1926; Charles M. Haar, In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1154
(1955).
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seen this to some extent with wetlands mitigation banking, but an
environmental mitigation fee program would need to be more farsighted than those banking operations in effect now. Just as long range
plans play an important role in terms of habitat mitigation, in the
pollution control context, long range pollution prevention and clean up
efforts identified in comprehensive plans help establish the validity and
success of an environmental mitigation fee program.
As we have seen with traditional impact fees, any environmental
mitigation fees would need very careful impact analysis in order to make
them feasible and defensible. Comprehensive plans should guide the
assessment of the impact of any development or polluting activity.
Regulators would then need to determine the units of environmental
impact associated with a new or existing project and multiply the
number of units by a price per unit. Again it is instructive to look at the
framework for the impact fee as a guide. For instance, polluters would
probably object to paying a fee to emit a pollutant that is below the
regulatory limit already established for their facility, just as the citizens
of Broward County, Florida, attacked the land use fee, claiming that the
fee was an unconstitutional tax." 2 Assuming that the mitigation fee
imposed does not exceed the cost of regulation, however, the standard
impact formula would then determine the environmental mitigation fee
for that project. At this point, the developer would have three choices.
First, the polluter or developer can simply pay the environmental
mitigation fee and proceed with the project. The funds derived from
these fees would be used to purchase habitat that has been identified in
the comprehensive plan or for pollution prevention and clean up projects
also identified in a pollution control element of the plan. Second, the
developer can reduce the environmental impact of the project to a point
at which the activity is still profitable but the environmental impact is
significantly less and thereby reduce the amount of payment required
pursuant to the mitigation fee. Third, the polluter can pay another firm
to mitigate the impact elsewhere. The last option is very similar to
tradeable emissions programs and wetlands mitigation programs we
have discussed earlier. However, there are significant differences
between these existing regulatory programs and an environmental
mitigation fee.
One of the main differences between an environmental
mitigation fee program and programs already in place is that existing
programs do not incorporate a fee for the impact of existing pollution or
112. See Contractors & Builders Assn. of Pinellas County v. City of Dunedin, 329 So. 2d
314, 318 (1976), supra note 14 and accompanying text. The courts, as stated earlier, struck
down this impact fee, basing its decision on the fact that the fee exceeded the county's cost
of regulation, "which was supposed to justify their collection." Id.
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development. Whereas a tradeable emissions program might set a cap
based on what is considered an acceptable level of pollution, and
wetlands mitigation fees do not take into account already decimated
wetlands, an environmental mitigation fee would set the baseline at zero.
This means that all pollution and development, whether or not "legal"
under the current regulatory framework, is assessed based on the
societal impact to the environment. This would force polluters or
developers to consider the environmental impact when designing a
project as contrasted with only considering pollutants that exceed some
stated level.
Market forces would take over because the polluter or developer
is then allowed to pay another firm to take over the responsibility for
mitigation and for complying with the comprehensive plan. The
incentive here is that a private mitigation company-a "mitigator"should be able to offer this service at a price that is less than the
environmental mitigation fee. 13 Thus, the invisible hand develops a
green thumb.
A. Legal Ramifications of Environmental Mitigation Fees
While this type of program does not at first glance appear to be
anything other than an exercise of the police power, it is important to
understand that mitigation fee programs must be able to avoid the labels
of an "unconstitutional tax" and/or a "taking." As our discussion above
of impact fees has indicated, the avoidance of these labels is best
accomplished by the application of the dual rational nexus test. In 'terms
of environmental mitigation fees, the idea is in essence the same as with
the impact fee-development can be charged a proportionate share of
the impact cost of the development on the environment or the
preservation of the environment, just as they are now legally charged
under impact fee programs for impacts that development has on roads,
parks, schools, and other hard infrastructure items. They cannot be
charged any more than their demonstrated proportionate share,
however. The next step is to ensure that a regulatory program is
established so as to accomplish the environmental goals for which the fee
is collected.
The second prong of the dual rational nexus test is the one in
which planning is critical and all too often lacking. In order for a
mitigation fee program to function as it should, long range plans and
goals should be established in a comprehensive plan. The dilemmas
encountered when such a plan is not in place can be seen in the
113. The economics of specialization and of scale both should yield lower costs to the
mitigator than to an enterprise engaged in other activities.
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Connecticut Supreme Court case
of Branhaven Plaza, L.L.C. v. Inland
4
Wetlands Commission of Branford.1
In Branhaven, a developer wanted to build a convenience store
on a parcel of land with some very minor and very small wetland areas.
Initially, the developer offered to build a bigger wetland offsite
(mitigate). The local government agreed, but then changed their minds
over fears that there were flood control problems with the proposal."' In
response to this, the developer offered to spend $25,000 to construct an
offsite wetland and to donate to the local government $25,000 worth of
engineering services (mitigation and mitigation fee)." 6 The local government agreed, but many people in the community objected to the building
of the convenience store on the grounds that only paying money to be
able to destroy the on-site wetlands was an inadequate and unacceptable
way of satisfying the mitigation requirements. The court ended up
striking down the fee, but not because they did not want to allow for
offsite mitigation or the imposition of a mitigation fee. The court struck
down the fee on the basis that there were no comprehensive plans and
goals for how the money was to be spent. Neither the developer, the
planning commission, nor the local government authority had
formulated a proposal for the creation of new wetlands or the
enhancement of existing wetlands. They were not acting in accordance
with a comprehensive plan. This result clearly shows the importance of
creating a comprehensive plan and long-range goals for environmental
quality including spending fees collected for environmental mitigation.
B. Implementing the Program
The first and perhaps most important step in the implementation
of an environmental mitigation fee program is the inclusion of a
comprehensive environmental preservation or pollution control program
in a comprehensive plan. All implementing actions would then be in
accordance with a comprehensive plan, with all the luster that
"accordance" or "consistency" adds. In preparing such a program, local
governments should conduct studies to establish the impact that
development has on the environment." 7 After conducting the studies,
local governments should prepare development performance standards
that reflect the nature of, and the extent of, the need for environmental

114. 251 Conn. 269, 740 A.2d 847 (1999).
115. Id. at 273.
116. Id. at 274.
117. Thomas W. Ledman, Local Government Environmental Mitigation Fees: Development
Exactions, the Next Generation,45 FLA. L. REV. 835, 865 (1993).
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mitigation. Any such mitigation requirement could be on a functional or
area basis, whichever is appropriate.
The more difficult aspect of implementation will be first defining
and then identifying the nexus between development and the need for
environmental protection or preservation. If a traditional impact fee
model is to be followed, some type of quantitative nexus between
development and environmental impact will be needed."8 If new
development is not on or adjacent to ecologically sensitive areas, such a
relationship may be difficult to establish. " 9
Current thinking often confines areas worthy of environmental
protection and preservation to places where water collects and wild
things, especially those that are threatened or endangered, live. Under
this confined view, environmental mitigation requirements could only
be based on the direct impacts of developments that are in or
immediately proximate to wetlands or habitat. But the environment is
more than just wetlands and habitat and the impacts of developments
extend to indirect as well as direct effects. Doesn't it include trees that
may or may not be home to red cockaded woodpeckers? Doesn't the
environment include open areas where children can explore? Isn't the
environment inclusive of unpaved places?
This more expansive view of the environment and the embodied
relationship between land disturbance and environmental consequences
offers a means for establishing a quantitative nexus between
development and the need for environmental protection and
preservation.' 2 Adopting this view in a local government's comprehensive plan would thereby establish the legal and planning framework for
programs such as environmental mitigation fees based upon the nature
and extent of land disturbance.

118. If the standards of "proportionality" set out in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374
(1994), are applied, such quantitative expressions would be a requirement.
119. It would appear that terrestrial ecological science is not yet able to establish a
statistical nexus between offsite development and ecological damage.
120. This is the concept endorsed in Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W. 2d 761 (Wis.
1972).

